Losing the Dividends of Neutrality in the Arctic

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This article aims to examine the ramifications of clearer but also more adversarial posturing in the Arctic through the analysis of two domains of international policymaking: climate change mitigation and the exploitation of natural resources. Photo: Marek Studzinski

The Arctic Institute NATO Series 2024-2025

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Since the end of the Cold War, the Arctic region has drawn little attention compared to other areas of geopolitical competition, such as East Asia or the Middle East. The benign nature of post-Cold War Arctic politics was partly due to the stances of the eight Arctic states (henceforth referred to as the ‘Arctic 8’). Among them, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark had all crafted postures of relative neutrality in the region, particularly towards Russia, to pursue peaceful cooperation in areas of transnational interest. One of the main instruments of cooperation in the Arctic has been the Arctic Council. Founded in 1991 originally as the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, the Arctic Council is, by design, a consensus-based organization with no defense and security agenda. The commitment of the Arctic 8 and the Arctic Council to neutrality has been used to develop joint plans for environmental protection as well as standards for the sustainable use of natural resources in the region.

This status quo has become increasingly challenged due to a conjunction of factors, including the discovery of vast reserves of natural resources in the region, the melting of the ice cap due to global warming, and heightened tensions with Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In reaction to the latter, Finland and Sweden successively joined NATO in 2023 and 2024, while Denmark withdrew its opt-out from the European Union’s defense framework immediately after the invasion in 2022. Increased tension between the US and several of its Arctic allies, particularly Denmark over the control of Greenland,¹⁾Aikman I (2025) Trump says he believes US will ‘get Greenland’. BBC News, 26 January, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/crkezj07rzro. Accessed on 9 June 2025 further complicated the security situation. Both NATO and the EU, nevertheless, find themselves with formally united fronts on their Arctic flanks. As prospects for a return to cooperation seem unlikely, this article aims to examine the ramifications of this clearer but also more adversarial posturing through the analysis of two domains of international policymaking: climate change mitigation and the exploitation of natural resources. We compare and assess the benefits of geographically delimited neutrality for the pursuit of transnational agendas against the cost of geostrategic competition toward a challenging power like Russia for the stability of the Arctic.

Climate Change Mitigation

In the period before the war, creating climate change mitigation efforts was an important arena for the Arctic 8. This was particularly clear in the Arctic Council and its various working groups. For example, scientists could share data on permafrost thaw²⁾Kertysova K & Ramnath A (2021) How Permaforst Thaw Puts the Russian Arctic at Risk. IPI Global Observatory, 22 November, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2021/11/how-permafrost-thaw-puts-the-russian-arctic-at-risk/. Accessed on 15 August 2024 and shifting ice floes that allowed for better modeling of how climate change was impacting the Arctic more seriously than the rest of the world. This is not to say that there were no challenges during this period, specifically the ongoing lack of clear information sharing³⁾Uryupova E (2021) Climate change and Geopolitics: Monitoring of a Thawing Permafrost. The Arctic Institute, 16 November, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/climate-change-geopolitics-monitoring-thawing-permafrost/. Accessed on 15 August 2024 through global data systems. Broadly speaking, however, Russian and Western scientists were able to work in tandem on larger climate projects such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment,⁴⁾Arctic Council (2005) Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, The Arctic Council, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/items/f63fd81c-2e04-4f2c-a68b-2e45c3706efc. Accessed on 15 August 2024 a large-scale scientific assessment of climate change in the Arctic coordinated through the Arctic Council in 2004.

For the three states that have most drastically changed their policies and strategies since February 2022 – Denmark, Finland, and Sweden – neutrality was instrumental in isolating their cooperation with Russia on climate change mitigation from its broader strategic competition with the United States and NATO. A 2022 Finnish Government report acknowledged⁵⁾Koivurova, T et al (2022) Arctic cooperation in a new situation: Analysis on the impacts of the Russian war of aggression. Swedish Government. https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/164521/VN_Selvitys_2022_3.pdf. Accessed 15 August 2024 that the war in Ukraine had led to significant setbacks regarding climate mitigation strategies. Sweden and Finland had more intense cooperation with Russia in the area of climate mitigation than Denmark, whose membership in NATO and generally closer relationship with the United States hindered the development of strong bilateral cooperation.

Despite a complicated history, Finland and Russia have long cooperated⁶⁾Happala J & Keskinen M (2022) Exploring 100 Years of Finnish Transboundary Water Interactions With Russia: An Historical Analysis of Diplomacy and Cooperation. Water Alternatives 15(1): 93-128 on matters of climate change mitigation, particularly that of sustainable forestry practices and biodiversity conservation. In 2021, Russia and Finland were joint leads of the ‘Biosecurity in the Arctic’ project as part of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), a multinational pollution monitoring mechanism of the Arctic Council.⁷⁾Arctic Council (2021) Biosecurity in the Arctic. The Arctic Council. https://arctic-council.org/projects/biosecurity-in-the-arctic/. Accessed 15 August 2024. Finland also emphasized⁸⁾Middleton A (2023) Navigating Uncertainties: Finland’s Evolving Arctic Policy and the Role of a Regionally Adaptive EU Arctic Policy. The Arctic Institute. 22 August. https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/navigating-uncertainties-finland-evolving-arctic-policy-role-regionally-adaptive-eu-arctic-policy/. Accessed 15 August 2024 the importance of Russian cooperation on climate issues in its 2013 Arctic Strategy and recognized Russia as a necessary partner in the Arctic, continuing to do so in its 2021 Update. Continual cooperation⁹⁾Staalesen A. (2021). With cooperative spirit, Finland targets Arctic Russia. The Barents Observer. 18 November. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/climate-crisis/with-cooperative-spirit-finland-targets-arctic-russia/111200. Accessed 15 August 2024 between Finland and Russia, despite the overall degradation in relations between the West and Russia was a hallmark of the early 2020s, drawing upon the Finnish tradition of neutrality and realism given the long border shared by both countries and their tangential history of cross-border cooperation.

Sweden and Russia also have a history of cooperating in nature conservation and the marine environment. In 2019, the Swedish Environment Protection Agency and the Russian Ministry of Nature Resources and Environment developed¹⁰⁾Naturvardsverket (2024) Russia – Cooperation on water, air, nature, and environmental protection. Naturvardsverket. 15 May. https://www.naturvardsverket.se/en/international/cooperation/bilateral/russia/#:~:text=Cooperation%20on%20hold,on%20environment%20is%20on%20hold. Accessed 15 August 2024 a bilateral work program for 2019-2021 including climate change, water and marine environment, environmental monitoring, nature conservation, environmental protection, and the sustainable development of cities. Sweden’s neutrality enabled bilateral cooperation even in the face of degraded relations between the West and Russia after the latter annexed Crimea in 2014.

Rather than specific bilateral initiatives, most of the cooperation that occurred between Denmark and Russia in the area of climate change mitigation took place through multilateral fora such as the Arctic Council, specifically through AMAP. There have also been some limited bilateral initiatives in the late 2000s between¹¹⁾Stauning P, Troshichev O & Janzhura A (2007) Polar Cap Index. Ministry of Transport and Energy. https://www.dmi.dk/fileadmin/Rapporter/SR/sr06-04.pdf. Accessed 15 August 2024 the Danish Meteorological Institute and the Russian Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute on polar caps.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, scientists have struggled to collaborate¹²⁾Andreeva A (2023) Science at Stake – Russia and the Arctic Council. Arctic Review on Law and Politics 14: 112-131 on climate change mitigation efforts leading to difficulties¹³⁾Mortensgaard L (2023) Arctic climate science is caught in the middle of geopolitical tension. The Danish Institute for International Studies. 6 October. https://www.diis.dk/en/research/arctic-climate-science-is-caught-in-the-middle-of-geopolitical-tension. Accessed 15 August 2024 in measuring permafrost thaw, or even greenhouse gas emissions. As one concrete example, an infrastructure project known as INTERACT¹⁴⁾INTERACT. 2017. Welcome to INTERACT – International Network for Terrestrial Research and Monitoring in the Arctic. https://eu-interact.org/. Accessed 15 August 2024 (International Network for Terrestrial Research and Monitoring in the Arctic) was built around identifying and understanding environmental change in the Arctic. However, out of the 60 terrestrial stations set up to monitor these changes, 17 were in Russian territory. With the war, the network now has huge gaps¹⁵⁾Macnamara K (2024) Scientists warn of missing Russian data causing Arctic climate blind spots. Phys Org. 22 January. https://phys.org/news/2024-01-scientists-russian-arctic-climate.html. Accessed 15 August 2024 and cannot fully measure and account for these changes in a way that represents the full Arctic. While some data is still being shared through international agreements such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), these are not Arctic-specific. As Russia makes up more than half of the Arctic, it cannot¹⁶⁾Spence J et al (2024) Arctic Climate Science: A Way Forward for Cooperation through the Arctic Council and Beyond. Harvard Kennedy Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. 18 March. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/arctic-climate-science-way-forward-cooperation-through-arctic-council-and-beyond. Accessed 15 August 2024 be left out when understanding how climate change will impact the Arctic.

This is not just happening on an interstate level. Individual scientists are also impacted as academic and research organizations in Europe and the United States have banned¹⁷⁾Matthews D (2023) News in depth: Russian researchers disappear from academic conferences as isolation bites. Science and Business. 14 November. https://sciencebusiness.net/news/international-news/news-depth-russian-researchers-disappear-academic-conferences-isolation. Accessed 15 August 2024 Russian participants from presenting their work at conferences and Russian institutions have largely responded in kind. Danish universities suspended¹⁸⁾University of Southern Denmark (2024) Danish universities suspend cooperation with Russia and Belarus. University of Southern Denmark. https://www.sdu.dk/en/nyheder/samarbejde_rus. Accessed 15 August 2024 all bilateral institutional cooperation with Russia and Belarus regarding the exchange of students and scientific personnel. Researchers at Danish universities can no longer attend scientific conferences in Russia and Belarus. This means that not only are Russian and Western institutions struggling to work together, but it has become even more difficult for individuals who might seek to cooperate despite these challenges to work with one another. The clearest shift from neutrality in the Arctic is, however, the pause in cooperation in the Arctic Council when its activities were formally frozen from 2022 to 2023. While the Council appears to have ostensibly returned¹⁹⁾Fouche G & Dickie G (2024). West, Russia manage limited cooperation in Arctic despite chill in ties. Reuters. 14 May. https://www.reuters.com/world/west-russia-manage-limited-cooperation-arctic-despite-chill-ties-2024-05-14/. Accessed 15 August 2024 to operations, there have been continued difficulties in sharing information and working with Russia on climate initiatives.

Two years into the invasion of Ukraine, there is a persistent lack of interest in joint projects with Russia, even for limited exchange of information under the auspices of the Arctic Council or the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. For instance, Sweden’s Agency for Marine and Water Management has paused²⁰⁾Swedish Agency Marine and Water Management (2022) Cooperation with Russia. Swedish Agency Marine and Water Management. https://www.havochvatten.se/en/eu-and-international/international-cooperation/bilateral-environmental-and-climate-cooperation/cooperation-with-russia.html. Accessed 15 August 2024 all cooperation with Russia since 24 February 2022. All bilateral projects between Sweden and Russia are still on hold. The distrust that is pervasive among the Arctic 8 towards Russia has led to difficulties in assessing climate change in the Arctic as a whole. This has consequences for information sharing, climate science, and the long-standing relationships key to the Arctic scientific community. These examples illustrate the challenges for states like Denmark, Finland, and Sweden to continue cooperation on climate change mitigation in the face of a more adversarial posture towards Russia.

Exploitation of Natural Resources

The Arctic’s wealth of natural resources has long been established²¹⁾NGU Geological Survey of Norway (2016) Mineral Resources in the Arctic: An Introduction. Geological Survey in Norway. https://www.ngu.no/upload/Aktuelt/CircumArtic/Mineral_Resources_Arctic_Shortver_Eng.pdf. Accessed 15 August 2024 with mining operations and fishing activities going back several centuries in Greenland, Alaska, and Northern Canada. International interest in Arctic resources was reignited in 2008 by a US Geological Survey (USGS) study, which estimated²²⁾Bird K et al (2008) Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle. USGS. https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/. Accessed 15 August 2024 Arctic reserves at 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids on top of vast reserves of minerals. Since then, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden have invested in numerous projects to tap into their Arctic reserves of natural resources. These projects have become all the more essential as the enmity between NATO countries and ‘no-limit’ partners Russia and China has grown. Sanctions and decoupling efforts have progressively cut the West from Russian and Chinese resources, leaving them in need of alternative sources. However, as the US has also begun to seek out critical minerals, the Trump administration’s call to ‘buy’ Greenland has also stoked tensions between the US and its Arctic allies.

The Arctic is a delicate environment²³⁾Arctic Council (2019) Good Practices For Environmental Impact Assessment and Meaningful Engagement in the Arctic. The Arctic Council. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/items/16e80a06-f002-452b-bfb0-6a24b4e5d93b. Accessed 15 August 2024 home to endangered animal species as well as around 4 million people, of which 10 percent are Indigenous populations. They face a region warming nearly four times the average rate of global warming resulting in a rapid and destabilizing melting of its ice cap. These changes are not even properly monitored anymore for the reasons outlined in the first part of this article. Although mining and drilling projects are national endeavors, they tend to have enduring and transboundary impacts on the environment and populations of the Arctic. For example, Canada’s Yukon territory, bordering Alaska, was polluted over the last decade by the neglect of the Wolverine²⁴⁾Gignac J (2020) A contaminated mess: how a Yukon mine left behind a $35 million clean-up bill. The Narwal. 9 June. https://thenarwhal.ca/contaminated-mess-how-yukon-mine-left-behind-35-million-bill/. Accessed 15 August 2024 zinc mine site, which ceased activities in 2015, and by cyanide leaks from the Eagle²⁵⁾Pilkington C. (2024) Documents show disastrous cyanide leaks continue at Eagle mine in Yukon. CBC. 24 July. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/eagle-mine-july-23-documents-cyanide-leaks-1.7272765. Accessed 15 August 2024 gold mine. A 2020 oil spill²⁶⁾Staalesen A (2022) Two years after huge Arctic spill, river water in Norilsk is still red from diesel fuel. The Barents Observer. 8 June. https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/industry-and-energy/two-years-after-huge-arctic-spill-river-water-in-norilsk-is-still-red-from-diesel-fuel/108343. Accessed 15 August 2024 near the Taymyr Peninsula in Northern Russia left nearby waters polluted and red-tainted, with likely serious ramifications.

The positions of Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are generally aligned in their commitment to undertake resource extraction activities in the Arctic under strict environmental standards. Greenland’s Mineral Resources Act²⁷⁾Naalakkersuisut (2019) Mineral Resources Act. Naalakkersuisut. https://govmin.gl/exploitation/get-an-exploitation-licence/mineral-resources-act/. Accessed 15 August 2024 regulating the attribution of licenses for oil and gas exploration in Greenland since 2009 includes strict provisions on safety, health, and environment defined by the local authorities. In its 2021 Arctic Strategy,²⁸⁾Government of Finland (2021) Arctic Policy Strategy. Government of Finland. https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/handle/10024/163245. Accessed 15 August 2024 Finland committed to the sustainable use of natural resources as recommended by the Arctic Environmental Impact Assessment,²⁹⁾Arctic Council Sustainable Development Working Group (2019) Arctic EIA – Environmental Impact Assessment. The Arctic Council. https://sdwg.org/what-we-do/projects/arctic-eia-environmental-impact-assessment/. Accessed 15 August 2024 a 2019 project of the Arctic Council’s Sustainable Development Working Group commissioned by Canada, Denmark, First Nations’ representative Gwich’in Council International, and Finland itself. Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region,³⁰⁾Government of Sweden (2020) Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. Government of Sweden. https://www.government.se/international-development-cooperation-strategies/2011/10/swedens-strategy-for-the-arctic-region/. Accessed 15 August 2024 last updated in 2020, also pledged to a sustainable use of natural resources while also acknowledging that the transition to renewable energy requires the extraction of rare earths and minerals present in the Arctic.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was, however, a turning point. Cooperation with Moscow, notably through the Arctic Council, came to a halt, and sanctions on Russian oil and gas led European countries to seek alternative energy sources. Furthermore, a broader decoupling effort³¹⁾Brinza A et al. (2024) EU-China relations: De-risking or de-coupling – the future of EU strategy toward China. European Parliament. 26 March. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_STU(2024)754446. Accessed 15 August from China, led by the United States and accelerated since the invasion of Ukraine, led to a decrease in Chinese investments in the Arctic. This gap was then filled by the Arctic states themselves, as they were incentivized to engage in rare earth and mineral exploration. The European Union has been at the forefront of this effort, culminating with the Critical Raw Materials Act³²⁾European Parliament and Council (2024) Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council. European Parliament and Council. 3 May. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401252. Accessed 15 August 2024 enacted by its parliament in April 2024. The Act aims to streamline permitting procedures and access to finance for critical materials extraction, processing, or recycling projects with the expressed goal of reducing dependencies on China.

No country seems better positioned to reap the benefits of the Act than perhaps Sweden. Its national industrial champion LKAB³³⁾LKAB (2022) LKAB’s four considerations forthe Critical Raw Materials Act. LKAB. 2 December. https://lkab.com/en/news/lkabs-four-considerations-for-the-critical-raw-materials-act/. Accessed 15 August 2024 provides 80 percent of Europe’s iron ore and, with the help of the Act, has goals to become a major producer of phosphorus, fluorine, gypsum, and other rare earth with an innovative waste material recycling project. Mining activities have indeed increased in Sweden since 2021 with investment on the rise after more than a decade of continuous decline (see table). The number of valid mining permits,³⁴⁾Bergsstaten (2025) Investigation permit. Bergsstaten. https://www.sgu.se/bergsstaten/statistik/undersokningstillstand/. Accessed 15 August which peaked in 2008 with 1,322 holders, declined to 550 in 2020 but has since rebounded to 751 in 2023. This number is set to rise even more as 2024 is on track to deliver one of the largest amounts of permits of the past decade. A large share of these permits are concentrated around the Northern city of Kiruna in the Swedish Arctic where LKAB already exploits³⁵⁾LKAB (2024) LKAB applies for three strategic projects in the EU for mining and upgrading rare earth metals. LKAB. 23 August. https://lkab.com/en/press/lkab-applies-for-three-strategic-projects-in-the-eu-for-mining-and-upgrading-rare-earth-metals/. Accessed 23 August 2024 iron and phosphorus mines and recently discovered³⁶⁾Fleming S (2023) Sweden discovers biggest rare earths deposit in EU. Financial Times. 12 January. https://www.ft.com/content/78706a10-7ea6-445e-835c-ad8dd51b6a34. Accessed 15 August 2024 further deposits of rare earths.

Finland, where investments in mineral exploration are also rising (see table), is also set to benefit from Europe’s turn to reduce dependencies on Russia and China. Just like Sweden, some of Finland’s largest mineral deposits³⁷⁾Chen J (2023) Agnico operating permit restored for Kittila mine in Finland. Mining.Com. 27 October. https://www.mining.com/agnico-has-kittila-operating-permit-restored-expects-30000-oz-of-additional-production/. Accessed 15 August 2024 can be found in its northernmost Arctic regions such as the multi-metal Boliden Kevista mine near Sodankylä or the Kittila mine, the largest gold producer in Europe, operated by Canadian company Agnico Eagle. A 2018 joint study of Finland and Norway proposed the development of a railway³⁸⁾Ministry of Transport and Communications (2018) Study on the Arctic rail line completed: Kirkenes routing to be examined further. Government of Finland. 3 September. https://lvm.fi/en/-/study-on-the-arctic-rail-line-completed-kirkenes-routing-to-be-examined-further-968073. Accessed 15 August connecting Kirkenes in northern Norway to southern Finland and even the Baltics (via a tunnel connecting Helsinki and Tallinn) and Murmansk in Russia. This interconnected network would have facilitated transport and exchanges of natural resources and commercial goods, notably with the opening of the Northern Sea Route. The plan was, however, mostly rolled back³⁹⁾Kahkohnen J (2022) Finnish Plans for an Arctic Railway – Geopolitics Are Intervening. Modern Diplomacy, 24 June. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/06/24/finnish-plans-for-an-arctic-railway-geopolitics-are-intervening/. Accessed 15 August 2024 with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the subsequent degradation of relations.

However, the trajectory of energy and mineral resource extraction in the Arctic is perhaps better illustrated by the case of Greenland. Denmark’s Arctic state status is solely due to its association with resource-rich Greenland, the largest island in the region. Its semi-autonomous government has cultivated aspirations for independence⁴¹⁾Hosa J (2023) Feeling the chill: Navigating Arctic governance amid Russia’s war on Ukraine. European Council on Foreign Relations. 18 May. https://ecfr.eu/publication/feeling-the-chill-navigating-arctic-governance-amid-russias-war-on-ukraine/. Accessed 15 August 2024 while historically keeping a position of neutrality vis-a-vis Russia and NATO. Potential revenues derived from the exploitation of its abundant natural resources,⁴²⁾Boersma T & Foley K (2014) The Greenland Gold Rush: Promise and Pitfalls of Greenland’s Energy and Mineral Resources. Brookings Institute. 24 September. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-greenland-gold-rush-promise-and-pitfalls-of-greenlands-energy-and-mineral-resources/. Accessed 15 August 2024 including iron ore, lead, zinc, diamonds, gold, rare earth elements, uranium, and oil, were used by the government as a platform to unveil the 2009 Self-Government Act following a successful referendum the year before. These were presented as a way for Greenland to gain autonomy by diversifying⁴³⁾Moraca S (2021) The fight over Greenland’s natural resources. Deutsche Welle. 4 September. https://www.dw.com/en/the-battle-over-greenlands-untapped-natural-resources/a-57138809. Accessed 15 August 2024 its economy away from traditional fishing and tourism industries and reducing its reliance on Danish subsidies. A boom in commodity prices in the early 2010s when demand for rare earth surged with China’s economic growth and American and European stimulus policies helped propel Greenland’s revenues.

The politics of independence, however, quickly interfered with Greenland’s energy and mineral expansion. The 2021 election of the Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) party, which campaigned on a pro-independence and environmental platform, was a turning point⁴⁴⁾Gronholt-Pedersen J (2021) Left-wing party wins Greenland election, opposes big mining project. Reuters. 7 April. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/left-wing-party-wins-greenland-election-opposes-big-mining-project-idUSKBN2BU1FF. Accessed 15 August 2024 for the territory’s natural resource strategy. Soon after its election, the IA-led coalition passed a law preventing the exploration of rare earth deposits containing uranium concentration. This law notably derailed the Kvanefjeld mine project and triggered a lawsuit⁴⁵⁾Impact International (2023) ETM sues Greenland for $11bn. Impact International. 28 August. https://impactpolicies.org/news/328/etm-sues-greenland-for-11bn. Accessed 15 August 2024 between Greenland’s government and the mine’s permit holder Energy Transition Minerals, an Australian company partly owned by China’s Shenghe Resources Holding. Other Chinese investments in Greenland such as the Isua iron ore mine project have since faded⁴⁶⁾Jonassen T (2021) Greenland Strips Chinese Mining Firm of License for Iron Ore Deposit. High North News. 23 November. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/greenland-strips-chinese-mining-firm-license-iron-ore-deposit. Accessed 15 August 2024 when they were seen as too risky for driving a potential wedge⁴⁷⁾Chen C (2022) China’s engagement in Greenland: mutual economic benefits and political non-interference. Polar Research (41). https://polarresearch.net/index.php/polar/article/view/7706. Accessed 15 August 2024 between Denmark and its Arctic territory and Denmark’s traditional ally – the United States. However, the recent push from President Trump to acquire Greenland⁴⁸⁾Aikman I (2025) Trump says he believes US will ‘get Greenland’. BBC News, 26 January, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/crkezj07rzro. Accessed on 9 June 2025 coupled with the results of its recent general elections won by the pro-business opposition⁴⁹⁾Lukiv J & Kirby P (2025) Greenland’s opposition wins election dominated by independence and Trump. BBC News. 12 March. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx2r3d0r8z0o. Accessed on 9 June 2025 renewed the territory’s incentive to align with Europe on resource exploration.⁵⁰⁾Cole B (2025) Greenland Signs Lucrative Minerals Deal with Europe in Blow to Trump. Newsweek. 22 May. https://www.newsweek.com/greenland-trump-permit-extraction-2075673. Accessed on 9 June 2025. Greenland’s government also joined Western sanctions on Russia and even imposed further interdictions⁵¹⁾Hosa J (2023) Feeling the chill: Navigating Arctic governance amid Russia’s war on Ukraine. European Council on Foreign Relations. 18 May. https://ecfr.eu/publication/feeling-the-chill-navigating-arctic-governance-amid-russias-war-on-ukraine/. Accessed 15 August 2024 on Russian ships wanting to fish in its waters.

The current consensus on fishing in the Arctic has also been fragmented by the general geopolitical instability. Contrary to Greenland’s blanket ban on Russian fishing in its waters, Norway has exempted⁵²⁾Negrete M (2023) Norway satisfied with its fisheries agreement with Russia for 2024. We are Aqua Culture. 24 October. https://weareaquaculture.com/news/fisheries/norway-satisfied-with-its-fisheries-agreement-with-russia-for-2024. Accessed 15 August 2024 cooperation on fishing quotas from the sanction packages directed at its hostile neighbor. Despite Russia’s suspension from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, a framework essential to determining global fishing quotas, the two countries have found areas of agreement on a str so impact on your career perspectivesictly bilateral basis. More concerning is the long-term viability of the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement⁵³⁾National Fisherman (2023) Arctic Ocean fisheries agreement on fragile ground as global tensions mount. Seafood Source. 10 March. https://www.seafoodsource.com/national-fisherman/arctic-ocean-fisheries-agreement-on-fragile-ground-as-global-tensions-mount. Accessed 15 August 2024 which went into effect in 2021 to prevent unregulated fishing in the Arctic. Although Russia and China are both parties to the agreement, mounting geopolitical tensions exemplified by Greenland’s ban could incite the two countries to opt out and tap freely into Arctic fishing stocks. This would be a likely scenario for China whose fishing fleet is notorious⁵⁴⁾Urbina I (2020) How China’s Expanding Fishing Fleet Is Depleting the World’s Oceans. Yale Environment 360. 17 August. https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-chinas-expanding-fishing-fleet-is-depleting-worlds-oceans. Accessed 15 August 2024 for operating globally⁵⁵⁾Myers S., Chang A., Watkins D., Fu C. (2022) How China Targets the Global Fish Supply. The New York Times. 26 September. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/09/26/world/asia/china-fishing-south-america.html. Accessed 15 August 2024 and in violation of international laws.

Cutting themselves from Russian energy supply and limiting Chinese dependencies is driving NATO countries, particularly Europeans, to rely more on their Arctic resources. Since Denmark, Finland, and Sweden chose to fully align themselves with NATO’s and the EU’s strategic outlooks, they unexpectedly have found themselves playing a major role in filling the natural resource gaps left by sanctions and protectionism. However, the opening of the Arctic to resource exploitation also renders cooperation more needed than ever as the risk of contamination, pollution, and stock depletion increases.

Conclusion

The benefits of geographically delimited neutrality in the pursuit of transnational objectives such as climate change mitigation or natural resources management are strong. Arctic states such as Denmark, Finland, and Sweden have historically been able to work together on such challenges by maintaining postures of relative neutrality even in the face of geopolitical pressures. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent realignment of the three countries with the EU’s and NATO’s security agendas have however watered down the traditional benefits of their neutral postures in the region. Added pressures from the US over the ownership of Greenland have only reinforced this trend. The European Union and its Nordic members are now incentivized to find alternative sources of oil, gas, and minerals to offset Russian sanctions and the West’s decoupling from China – leading to increased natural resource extraction in the region and more risks of spillovers and contaminations.

Tensions between Russia and its seven NATO like-minded counterparts in the Arctic are not going away anytime soon. Incentives for multinational cooperation are low and the usual forum provided by the Arctic Council is being sidelined by geopolitical competition. As a result, the most realistic course of action for the Arctic 8 is to maintain ongoing bilateral dialogues with Russia on practical measures to ensure the circulation of data on climate change and fish stock management while preserving their high environmental standards through the intensification of their resource extraction activities. The return of a functional Arctic able to ensure climate change mitigation and the sustainable use of natural resources at the multinational level will however require the resolution of larger geopolitical challenges between Russia and NATO, going far beyond the remit of the region.

Gabriella Gricius is a Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute. Nicolas Jouan is a defence and security analyst at RAND Europe.